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pj
66fd5bce5d
folio extracts lastAction, and extractor values are persisted as extractor_changes, so the password still reached the run directory through the spec after the three render sites were closed. The wrap sits in the runner rather than in lastActionFields because the hosts hold the next step's tree, not the one the action was chosen against: a field that stops being secure between the two would publish what the trace withheld. Live and replay now agree byte for byte.
90 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
90 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
package verifier
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import (
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"github.com/dop251/goja"
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"github.com/priyanshujain/sanderling/internal/hierarchy"
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)
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// RedactedInputText stands in for a typed value in every record. It is fixed,
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// so it gives away neither the value nor its length.
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const RedactedInputText = "[redacted]"
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// secureFact is what a target says about being a secure text entry. `reported`
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// separates "the platform says this is not one" from "the platform says
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// nothing", which are the two cases the redaction rule has to tell apart.
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type secureFact struct {
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reported bool
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secure bool
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}
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// secureFactFromHandle reads an element handle's own report. The web host
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// injects handles built in the page, which carry no selector to resolve against
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// the goja-side tree, so the handle is the only thing that knows.
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func secureFactFromHandle(object *goja.Object) secureFact {
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value := object.Get("secure")
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if value == nil || goja.IsUndefined(value) || goja.IsNull(value) {
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return secureFact{}
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}
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return secureFact{reported: true, secure: value.ToBoolean()}
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}
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func secureFactOf(element *hierarchy.Element) secureFact {
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if element == nil {
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return secureFact{}
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}
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return secureFact{reported: element.SecureReported(), secure: element.Secure}
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}
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// RecordedActionText renders the typed value of an action for anything that is
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// persisted or sent, resolving the action's target in the tree it was chosen
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// against.
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func RecordedActionText(action Action, tree *hierarchy.Tree) string {
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if action.Kind != ActionKindInputText {
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return action.Text
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}
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var target *hierarchy.Element
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if tree != nil && action.On != "" {
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target = tree.Find(action.On)
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}
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return recordedInputText(action.Text, secureFactOf(target))
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}
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// RecordedAction is the action as everything downstream of the dispatch sees
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// it. The runner reports the previous step's action to the spec as
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// state.lastAction, and a spec extracting it (examples/folio/sanderling/spec.ts)
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// writes it to the trace, so the copy the runner keeps carries the recorded
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// text rather than the typed one.
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//
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// The decision is made here rather than where the two hosts render
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// state.lastAction because only the caller holds the tree that can answer it.
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// The hosts hold the NEXT step's tree, where the selector may name a different
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// element (a revealed password field reports secure:false) or none at all, and
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// cmd/internal-tools/oracle-reduction replays state.lastAction from the trace's
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// already-recorded text, which redacting here matches exactly.
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func RecordedAction(action Action, tree *hierarchy.Tree) Action {
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action.Text = RecordedActionText(action, tree)
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return action
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}
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// recordedInputText is the one place a typed value is rendered for a record.
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// The prompt's recent-action memory, the numbered candidate list, the trace and
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// the action the runner reports back as state.lastAction all go through it, so
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// a fifth record added later cannot publish a value the other four withhold.
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// The driver dispatch reads Action.Text directly and is the only reader of the
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// real value, which is what keeps the app receiving the keystrokes a user would
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// have produced.
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//
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// A target the platform reports as a secure entry is redacted, and so is a
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// target carrying no report at all. iOS and web state the fact on every
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// editable element, so a missing one means Android, whose native tree mapper
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// drops uiautomator's password attribute before the sidecar sees it. There a
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// password field cannot be told from a search box, and the target that cannot
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// be told apart is treated as the credential.
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func recordedInputText(text string, target secureFact) string {
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if target.reported && !target.secure {
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return text
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}
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return RedactedInputText
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}
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