fix(verifier): a secure field's typed value never reaches the record

A folio login run wrote the account email and password in cleartext into
llm-calls.jsonl, 166 times in one run, beside screenshots of the same
screens. Three sites rendered it: the recent-action memory, the candidate
list, and the trace. One helper now covers all three so a fourth cannot
bypass it, and the driver still receives the real text.

Android redacts every typed value because it cannot tell a secure field
from any other. That asymmetry is deliberate and documented: safe by
default on the target that cannot tell.

internal/verifier/marshal.go

@@ -124,6 +124,14 @@ func nodeObject(runtime *goja.Runtime, tree *hierarchy.Tree, node *hierarchy.Nod
 	_ = object.Set("focused", element.Focused)
 	_ = object.Set("selected", element.Selected)
 	_ = object.Set("editable", element.Editable)
+	// Three-valued, unlike the other state flags: null where the platform
+	// reported nothing at all, which is what separates an ordinary field from a
+	// password field on a platform that cannot tell them apart.
+	var secure any
+	if element.SecureReported() {
+		secure = element.Secure
+	}
+	_ = object.Set("secure", secure)
 	_ = object.Set("x", centerX)
 	_ = object.Set("y", centerY)
 	_ = object.Set(tagSelector, unambiguousSelector(tree, node, selector))