fix(verifier): a secure field's typed value never reaches the record

A folio login run wrote the account email and password in cleartext into
llm-calls.jsonl, 166 times in one run, beside screenshots of the same
screens. Three sites rendered it: the recent-action memory, the candidate
list, and the trace. One helper now covers all three so a fourth cannot
bypass it, and the driver still receives the real text.

Android redacts every typed value because it cannot tell a secure field
from any other. That asymmetry is deliberate and documented: safe by
default on the target that cannot tell.
This commit is contained in:
pj committed 2026-08-18 17:17:03 +05:30
1 parent b1e95739ad
commit 38d328df90
12 files changed
+418 -16

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@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ const canonicalElement = `{
"enabled": true,
"focused": false,
"id": "TxnAmountField",
"secure": null,
"selected": false,
"text": "199",
"x": 200,
+20 -2
View File
@@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ func (v *Verifier) CurrentScreen() string {
return v.lastTree.Elements[0].Screen
}
// Tree returns the hierarchy of the most recent snapshot, nil when none was
// pushed. It is what a caller resolves an action's target against.
func (v *Verifier) Tree() *hierarchy.Tree {
return v.lastTree
}
// SampleInput draws one InputText value from the shared corpus via the bundled
// __sanderlingSampleInput__. It errors when the bundle did not install the
// callable (a raw-JS fixture) so the caller can skip typing rather than send an
@@ -139,6 +145,10 @@ type ActionCandidate struct {
// prob is the internal accumulated selection probability, summed across
// dedup, then rounded into Weight. Not exposed in the prompt directly.
prob float64
// secure is what the target reports about being a secure text entry, which
// is what Description is rendered under. It is not part of what the model
// sees.
secure secureFact
}
// maxLabelRunes caps a visible-text label so joined descendant text stays short
@@ -402,6 +412,7 @@ func (v *Verifier) candidateFromDescriptor(value goja.Value, labels labelContext
Kind: kind,
Label: target.label,
InputType: target.inputType,
secure: target.secure,
Action: Action{Kind: kind, On: target.selector, X: target.x, Y: target.y, Text: text},
}, true
case ActionKindScroll:
@@ -464,6 +475,7 @@ type resolvedTarget struct {
selector string
label string
inputType string
secure secureFact
}
// resolveTarget reads an authored action's target. Ax element handles carry
@@ -498,10 +510,13 @@ func (v *Verifier) resolveTarget(value goja.Value, labels labelContext) (resolve
if selector == "" {
selector = stringField(object, "selector")
}
target := resolvedTarget{x: x, y: y, selector: selector}
target := resolvedTarget{x: x, y: y, selector: selector, secure: secureFactFromHandle(object)}
if element := v.findBySelector(selector); element != nil {
target.label = labels.label(element)
target.inputType = inputTypeHint(element)
if !target.secure.reported {
target.secure = secureFactOf(element)
}
}
if target.label == "" {
target.label = truncateLabel(v.handleLabel(object, labels))
@@ -519,6 +534,7 @@ func (v *Verifier) targetFromSelector(selector string, labels labelContext) reso
target.x, target.y = element.Bounds.Center()
target.label = labels.label(element)
target.inputType = inputTypeHint(element)
target.secure = secureFactOf(element)
return target
}
@@ -556,6 +572,7 @@ func (v *Verifier) collectBuiltin(verb string, prob float64, weighted bool, labe
element := targets[entry.targetIndex].element
candidate.Label = labels.label(element)
candidate.InputType = inputTypeHint(element)
candidate.secure = secureFactOf(element)
}
*out = append(*out, candidate)
}
@@ -664,7 +681,8 @@ func describeCandidate(candidate ActionCandidate) string {
}
return fmt.Sprintf("Type into %q", candidate.Label)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("Type %q into %q", candidate.Action.Text, candidate.Label)
return fmt.Sprintf("Type %q into %q",
recordedInputText(candidate.Action.Text, candidate.secure), candidate.Label)
case ActionKindScroll:
return "Scroll " + candidate.Direction
case ActionKindSwipe:
+8 -6
View File
@@ -425,7 +425,9 @@ func TestCandidatesCallsAuthoredLeafOnce(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("authored action on a disabled control was dropped: %v", descriptions(candidates))
}
// Authored InputText replays its own sampled value (LLM does not supply it).
authored, ok := findCandidate(candidates, `Type "42" into "Amount"`)
// The fixture is an android tree, which reports no secure fact, so the
// rendered value is redacted while the action still carries it.
authored, ok := findCandidate(candidates, `Type "[redacted]" into "Amount"`)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("authored typing missing: %v", descriptions(candidates))
}
@@ -747,8 +749,8 @@ func TestCandidatesAcceptASingleItemAuthoredSampler(t *testing.T) {
const webFieldTreeJSON = `{
"attributes": {"tag": "html", "bounds": "[0,0,400,800]"},
"children": [
{"attributes": {"resource-id": "txn-amount", "tag": "input", "class": "input amount-input", "bounds": "[0,100,400,160]"}, "editable": true, "enabled": true, "children": []},
{"attributes": {"resource-id": "txn-note", "tag": "input", "class": "input", "bounds": "[0,200,400,260]"}, "editable": true, "enabled": true, "children": []}
{"attributes": {"resource-id": "txn-amount", "tag": "input", "class": "input amount-input", "bounds": "[0,100,400,160]"}, "editable": true, "enabled": true, "secure": false, "children": []},
{"attributes": {"resource-id": "txn-note", "tag": "input", "class": "input", "bounds": "[0,200,400,260]"}, "editable": true, "enabled": true, "secure": false, "children": []}
]
}`
@@ -761,14 +763,14 @@ const webFieldTreeJSON = `{
func TestCandidatesNameWebAuthoredFieldsByTheirHint(t *testing.T) {
const amountHandle = `{
"id": "txn-amount", "text": "", "desc": "", "class": "input amount-input",
"clickable": true, "enabled": true, "editable": true, "focused": false,
"clickable": true, "enabled": true, "editable": true, "focused": false, "secure": false,
"x": 200, "y": 130, "bounds": {"left": 0, "top": 100, "right": 400, "bottom": 160},
"attrs": {"tag": "input", "aria-label": "", "id": "txn-amount",
"class": "input amount-input", "placeholder": "0.00", "hintText": "Amount"}
}`
const noteHandle = `{
"id": "txn-note", "text": "", "desc": "", "class": "input",
"clickable": true, "enabled": true, "editable": true, "focused": false,
"clickable": true, "enabled": true, "editable": true, "focused": false, "secure": false,
"x": 200, "y": 230, "bounds": {"left": 0, "top": 200, "right": 400, "bottom": 260},
"attrs": {"tag": "input", "aria-label": "", "id": "txn-note", "class": "input",
"placeholder": "What's this for?", "hintText": "Note (optional)"}
@@ -807,7 +809,7 @@ func TestCandidatesNameWebAuthoredFieldsByTheirHint(t *testing.T) {
// The identifier arm must stay blind to anything a user reads, hint included.
func TestCandidatesNameWebAuthoredFieldsByIdentifierOnThatArm(t *testing.T) {
const amountHandle = `{
"id": "txn-amount", "text": "", "editable": true, "enabled": true,
"id": "txn-amount", "text": "", "editable": true, "enabled": true, "secure": false,
"x": 200, "y": 130,
"attrs": {"tag": "input", "hintText": "Amount"}
}`
+8
View File
@@ -124,6 +124,14 @@ func nodeObject(runtime *goja.Runtime, tree *hierarchy.Tree, node *hierarchy.Nod
_ = object.Set("focused", element.Focused)
_ = object.Set("selected", element.Selected)
_ = object.Set("editable", element.Editable)
// Three-valued, unlike the other state flags: null where the platform
// reported nothing at all, which is what separates an ordinary field from a
// password field on a platform that cannot tell them apart.
var secure any
if element.SecureReported() {
secure = element.Secure
}
_ = object.Set("secure", secure)
_ = object.Set("x", centerX)
_ = object.Set("y", centerY)
_ = object.Set(tagSelector, unambiguousSelector(tree, node, selector))
+71
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
package verifier
import (
"github.com/dop251/goja"
"github.com/priyanshujain/sanderling/internal/hierarchy"
)
// RedactedInputText stands in for a typed value in every record. It is fixed,
// so it gives away neither the value nor its length.
const RedactedInputText = "[redacted]"
// secureFact is what a target says about being a secure text entry. `reported`
// separates "the platform says this is not one" from "the platform says
// nothing", which are the two cases the redaction rule has to tell apart.
type secureFact struct {
reported bool
secure bool
}
// secureFactFromHandle reads an element handle's own report. The web host
// injects handles built in the page, which carry no selector to resolve against
// the goja-side tree, so the handle is the only thing that knows.
func secureFactFromHandle(object *goja.Object) secureFact {
value := object.Get("secure")
if value == nil || goja.IsUndefined(value) || goja.IsNull(value) {
return secureFact{}
}
return secureFact{reported: true, secure: value.ToBoolean()}
}
func secureFactOf(element *hierarchy.Element) secureFact {
if element == nil {
return secureFact{}
}
return secureFact{reported: element.SecureReported(), secure: element.Secure}
}
// RecordedActionText renders the typed value of an action for anything that is
// persisted or sent, resolving the action's target in the tree it was chosen
// against.
func RecordedActionText(action Action, tree *hierarchy.Tree) string {
if action.Kind != ActionKindInputText {
return action.Text
}
var target *hierarchy.Element
if tree != nil && action.On != "" {
target = tree.Find(action.On)
}
return recordedInputText(action.Text, secureFactOf(target))
}
// recordedInputText is the one place a typed value is rendered for a record.
// The prompt's recent-action memory, the numbered candidate list and the trace
// all go through it, so a fourth record added later cannot publish a value the
// other three withhold. The driver dispatch reads Action.Text directly and is
// the only reader of the real value, which is what keeps the app receiving the
// keystrokes a user would have produced.
//
// A target the platform reports as a secure entry is redacted, and so is a
// target carrying no report at all. iOS and web state the fact on every
// editable element, so a missing one means Android, whose native tree mapper
// drops uiautomator's password attribute before the sidecar sees it. There a
// password field cannot be told from a search box, and the target that cannot
// be told apart is treated as the credential.
func recordedInputText(text string, target secureFact) string {
if target.reported && !target.secure {
return text
}
return RedactedInputText
}
+111
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
package verifier
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
// typedCredential stands in for what a login setup types. Nothing rendered for
// a record may carry it.
const typedCredential = "fixture-passphrase-9f21"
// secureLoginTreeJSON is the shape iOS and web produce for a login form: both
// report `secure` on every editable field, so a field carrying `secure:false`
// is positively known not to be a credential entry.
const secureLoginTreeJSON = `{
"attributes": {"bounds": "[0,0,390,844]", "class": "Window"},
"children": [
{"attributes": {"identifier": "LoginEmail", "class": "TextField", "hintText": "Email", "bounds": "[20,200,370,244]"},
"editable": true, "enabled": true, "secure": false, "children": []},
{"attributes": {"identifier": "LoginPassword", "class": "SecureTextField", "hintText": "Password", "bounds": "[20,260,370,304]"},
"editable": true, "enabled": true, "secure": true, "children": []}
]
}`
// androidLoginTreeJSON is the same form as Android reports it. The native tree
// mapper drops uiautomator's password attribute, so neither field carries the
// fact and the two are indistinguishable.
const androidLoginTreeJSON = `{
"attributes": {"bounds": "[0,0,1080,2340]"},
"children": [
{"attributes": {"resource-id": "login_email", "class": "android.widget.EditText", "hintText": "Email", "bounds": "[20,200,1060,300]"},
"enabled": true, "children": []},
{"attributes": {"resource-id": "login_password", "class": "android.widget.EditText", "hintText": "Password", "bounds": "[20,320,1060,420]"},
"enabled": true, "children": []}
]
}`
func authoredTypingCandidates(t *testing.T, selector, text, treeJSON string) []ActionCandidate {
t.Helper()
actions := `{kind:'actions', generate: () => [{kind:'InputText', into:'` + selector +
`', text:'` + text + `'}]}`
return mustCandidates(t, enumVerifier(t, actions, treeJSON), LabelSourceVisibleText)
}
func TestCandidatesRedactTextTypedIntoASecureField(t *testing.T) {
candidates := authoredTypingCandidates(t, "id:LoginPassword", typedCredential, secureLoginTreeJSON)
if len(candidates) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("candidates = %v, want the one authored typing action", descriptions(candidates))
}
candidate := candidates[0]
if !strings.Contains(candidate.Description, RedactedInputText) {
t.Errorf("candidate description = %q, want the typed value redacted", candidate.Description)
}
if !strings.Contains(candidate.Description, "Password") {
t.Errorf("candidate description = %q, want it to still name the field typed into", candidate.Description)
}
if candidate.Action.Text != typedCredential {
t.Errorf("candidate action text = %q, want the real value so the driver still types it", candidate.Action.Text)
}
}
func TestCandidatesRedactEveryTypedValueWhereTheTargetCannotReportSecure(t *testing.T) {
for _, selector := range []string{"id:login_email", "id:login_password"} {
candidates := authoredTypingCandidates(t, selector, typedCredential, androidLoginTreeJSON)
if len(candidates) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%s: candidates = %v, want the one authored typing action", selector, descriptions(candidates))
}
if strings.Contains(candidates[0].Description, typedCredential) {
t.Errorf("%s: candidate description carries the typed value: %q", selector, candidates[0].Description)
}
}
}
func TestCandidatesKeepTextTypedIntoAFieldReportedNotSecure(t *testing.T) {
const address = "[email protected]"
candidates := authoredTypingCandidates(t, "id:LoginEmail", address, secureLoginTreeJSON)
if len(candidates) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("candidates = %v, want the one authored typing action", descriptions(candidates))
}
if !strings.Contains(candidates[0].Description, address) {
t.Errorf("candidate description = %q, want the typed value on a field reported not secure", candidates[0].Description)
}
}
// A spec that types into an element HANDLE is the shape every login setup has
// (examples/folio/sanderling/spec.ts). The handle carries the goja host's own
// `secure` field, which is a plain boolean and reads false on a platform that
// reports nothing, so a rule trusting it would leave every Android value in the
// clear. The tree the handle names is the only carrier of the three-way fact.
func TestCandidatesRedactTextTypedIntoAnAndroidElementHandle(t *testing.T) {
v := newVerifier(t)
loadActionSpec(t, v, `
import { InputText, actions, extract } from "@sanderling/spec";
const field = extract((s) => s.ax.find({ "resource-id": "login_password" })).named("field");
globalThis.actions = actions(() =>
field.current ? [InputText({ into: field.current, text: "`+typedCredential+`" })] : []);
`)
pushTree(t, v, androidLoginTreeJSON)
candidates := mustCandidates(t, v, LabelSourceVisibleText)
if len(candidates) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("candidates = %v, want the one authored typing action", descriptions(candidates))
}
if strings.Contains(candidates[0].Description, typedCredential) {
t.Errorf("candidate description carries the typed value: %q", candidates[0].Description)
}
if candidates[0].Action.Text != typedCredential {
t.Errorf("candidate action text = %q, want the real value so the driver still types it",
candidates[0].Action.Text)
}
}